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THE SIREN SONG OF HISTORY:
ORIGINALISM AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
Reviewed by Jeffrey Shulman
THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE. Edited by
Daniel L. Dreisbach, Mark David Hall and Jeffrey H. Morrison. Foreword
by Mark A. Noll. University of Notre Dame Press 2009. Pp. 316. ISBN:
0-268-02602-5;
CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT. By Donald L. Drakeman.
Cambridge University Press 2010. Pp. 371. ISBN: 0-521-11918-9;
GOD AND THE FOUNDERS: MADISON, WASHINGTON, AND JEFFERSON. By
Vincent Phillip Muñoz. Cambridge University Press 2009. Pp. 242.
ISBN: 0-521-51515-7.
Happy people have no history.
Leo Tolstoy
(quoting a French proverb)
It is said that we are all originalists now. No doubt some of us are
more faint-hearted than others, but originalism has blossomed into so
many versions of its original self that there is room for everyone at the
party.1 The attraction of originalist scholarship to legal professionals—
law professors and jurists alike—raises especially interesting questions.
While a few legal professionals are historical scholars of a high order,
most are content to be second-hand historians, their scholarship
borrowed to serve other academic interests or the demands of legal
advocacy. Donald Drakeman observes that the work of the Supreme
 Associate Professor, Legal Research and Writing, Georgetown Law, Washington, D.C.
Professor Shulman‟s most recent articles include Epic Considerations: The Speech That the
Supreme Court Would Not Hear in Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 35 (2011);
The Parent as (Mere) Educational Trustee: Whose Education Is It, Anyway?, 89 NEB. L. REV. 290
(2010); and Free Speech at What Cost: Snyder v. Phelps and Speech-Based Tort Liability, 2010
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 313 (2010).
1. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L.J. 239
(2009).
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Court has been based often on “widely read and highly regarded
histories [written by scholars] whose craft had not yet developed the
dedication to nuance, to cultural frame of reference, or to the degree of
objectivity expected of historians seeking tenure in twenty-first-century
academia.” (147) No doubt, this observation is true enough, and
nowhere more so than when the Court has been faced with questions of
religious freedom; but it suggests that a sophisticated historical
scholarship will help legal professionals reach a more reliable
understanding of the original meaning of the Religion Clauses. Alas,
historical reliability is not likely to be of much value to the legal
professional.
Indeed, there is an almost certain guarantee that the muse of history
is not going to help those who want the Religion Clauses to stand for
something determinate, at least for something determinate enough to
serve a heuristic purpose in legal controversy. 2 Dedication to nuance (a
word, by the way, etymologically related to shadows and obscurity) will
be little appreciated by those who assume that Clio promises her suitors
a clear jurisprudential pathway. The works reviewed here remind us that
history is a fickle hermeneutical mistress; she may appear charming in
her simplicity, but, in fact, she is a most complex and unreliable
creature, rarely a firm foundation for legal argument or doctrinebuilding. What did the Religion Clauses mean to the eighteenth
century? Most likely as many things as they mean to us today.
The collection of brief biographical essays that compose The
Forgotten Founders on Religion and Public Life reminds us that “it is
artificial to limit „the founders‟ to a few individuals.” (x) More
specifically, the essays are meant to “make a difference in helping
Americans in the twenty-first century understand the complex role of
religion in our nation‟s first years.” (xi) The “vital role [religion played]
in the American founding project” is complex in a way that an
overemphasis on a relatively few founders cannot capture. (xiii) What
the collection is not meant to be is a polemical effort to ballast the
2. On the use and abuse of historical evidence in Establishment Clause controversy, see,
e.g., Steven K. Green, “Bad History”: The Lure of History in Establishment Clause Adjudication,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1717 (2006); Steven G. Gey, More or Less Bunk: The Establishment
Clause Answers That History Doesn’t Provide, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1617 (2004). Cf., e.g.,
Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and Constitutional Justice, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1611, 1622 (1997); and Daniel L. Dreisbach, Everson and the Command of
History: The Supreme Court, Lessons in History, and the Church-State Debate in America, in
EVERSON REVISITED: RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND LAW AT THE CROSSROADS 23-57 (Jo Renée
Formicola & Hubert Morken eds., Rowman & Littlefield 1997). See generally DANIEL A.
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (Univ. Chi. Press 2002).
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historical record by describing the views of the religiously inclined
forgotten founders. To make this point, Mark Noll points to “the
complexity of what the authors achieve”:
By broadening the notion of “the founders,” they draw in
individuals who promoted a quite different kind of deism (Thomas
Paine, author of the decisive piece of propaganda, Common
Sense), or who adhered to a quirky individual religion (the
Philadelphia physician Benjamin Rush), or who maintained a
moderate Anglican position (the Virginia jurist and first U.S.
Attorney General, Edmund Randolph). The historical payoff from
studying a broad group of founders is to enrich rather than
simplify our picture of what the founders “believed.” (x)
It is true that a broadened notion of “the founders” achieves this
complexity, but the volume‟s historical payoff would have been rich
enough had the editors put aside the decisively different Paine, the
theistic Hamilton, and the quirky Rush. For the resulting picture
would have provided a more coherent reminder of the compelling
place that traditional religiosity occupied in the lives of many of the
men and women who contributed mightily to our nation‟s ideological
origins. Even as the collection stands, it is hard not to see it as a
polemical contribution, if a somewhat faint-hearted one, to the debate
about the religious world of our founding fathers. In fact, this
contribution is the collection‟s real strength.
One might question the editors‟ premise that “there has long been a
tendency to discount or ignore the role of religion in the American
founding in general.” (xiii) Or, at least, whether this tendency has not
been sufficiently corrected. But assuming the premise to be true, these
essays operate as a corrective to what the editors refer to as “religious
illiteracy” among secular scholars. (xiv) The strength of the collection
lies not in its complexity, but in its effort to draw attention to a religious
consensus that receives too little academic interest. By providing a
broader definition of “founder”—a definition that allows for the
inclusion of Abigail Adams, Samuel Adams, Oliver Ellsworth,
Alexander Hamilton, Patrick Henry, John Jay, Thomas Paine, Edmund
Randolph, Benjamin Rush, Roger Sherman, and Mercy Otis Warren—
and thus by providing a more complete picture of the founders‟ views,
the collection hopes to bring to the historical foreground a set of themes
that form a significant part of the country‟s foundational beliefs.
What Edith Gelles says of Abigail Adams might be said of most of
the figures we encounter in these essays: “Belief was like the air she
breathed; it surrounded her and was taken for granted as a truth that
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sustained life.” (30) The commonplace-ness of deep religious belief
perhaps has contributed to its being taken for granted in scholarly
circles, and if all this collection did was to show that religion was
important to the founders, forgotten and non-forgotten alike, it would be
worthy of note. But time and again more particular thematic notes
resound through these biographies. Above all, the lives discussed here
(most of them, at any rate) testify to a prevailing providentialism. All of
life was considered providential to Abigail Adams. “[N]othing occurred
except by the will of God.” (31) Such abiding trust in God‟s providence
not only provided comfort and assurance in times of personal crisis (it
was a time when sparrows fell with inconceivable frequency), but this
same trust was the hallmark of the common political vision that America
was the special object of divine solicitousness. In our post-modern,
post-colonial times, we may take such sentiments as little more than
congratulatory imperial rhetoric. For substance, we look to serious
political theorists (even such “forgotten” ones as Vattel, Grotius,
Sydney, Beccaria, or Pufendorf). The point of this collection is that we
pay insufficient attention to the substantive biblical and theological
milieu within which many of the founders lived—and within which they
waged revolution.
The note of providentialism is heard in almost every entry. For
John Jay, the career of American independence and nation-building
came about by the „great plan of Providence.‟” (146) In this respect,
America was thought of as special. The new nation was uniquely
committed to moral principles consistent with the divine plan, uniquely
positioned to serve as an example of divine purpose. Rosemarie Zagarri
writes that Mercy Otis Warren “maintained that God had played a
special role in enabling Americans to secure their freedom and establish
the United States as a beacon of liberty to other nations in the world.”
(285) Similarly, Gary Smith describes how Samuel Adams expected
“that God would „erect a mighty empire in America‟ characterized by
biblical morality and manners and zealous efforts to spread liberty and
Christianity to the world.” (50) Indeed, rationalism and republicanism
could co-exist with a fervid moral millenarianism, as in the case of
Benjamin Rush. By Rush‟s lights, as Robert Abzug tells us, “America,
if it fulfilled its mission, would lead the world to the Second Coming
prophesied by the Great Awakening.” (227-28) The new order of the
ages required a new republican virtue, even if that meant, for Rush, a
system of education that was designed to “convert men into republican
machines.” (232)
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The linkage of liberty and Christianity, of religion and the republic,
was the essence of a new American exceptionalism. For God‟s
protection of the new nation‟s freedom was tightly connected to moral
concerns. The providential vision was in part a legacy of the Puritan
covenantal tradition. God‟s blessing was not unconditional: His new
kingdom on earth required a revolution in moral righteousness as well as
in political rights. From the font of providentialism flowed a sense of
the critical importance of Christian virtue; from Puritanism, a sense of
its fragility. Rectitude, Samuel Adams argued, “would forever be „the
Soul of a Republican Government.‟” (48-49) And religion was the soul
of rectitude. Patrick Henry failed in his bid to obtain a general
assessment to support religious teaching—and we have come to see
Madison and Jefferson as the true progenitors of our religious
freedom—but, as Thomas Buckley reminds us, Henry had excellent
company in thinking that religion was the virtual ingredient of a virtuous
society, both among non-forgotten founders (like Washington and
Adams) and the probably forgotten (like Richard Henry Lee). (138-39)
Righteousness alone, Henry wrote, can exalt a nation. (139) Even
Alexander Hamilton at his most deistic declared, as Gregg Frazer writes,
that religion was one of the “venerable pillars that support the edifice of
civilized society.” (114) And when license replaced liberty, when
religion and morality assumed separate posts, the blessings of divine
providence would be withdrawn—and the hope of a Christian Sparta
(this vision belonged to Samuel Adams (49)) would be lost. “People
were „not worth saving,‟” Adams wrote, “if they „lost their virtue.‟” (49)
The irreligious French Revolution provided salutary notice of this
possibility.
This picture of religious consensus does more than flesh out the
historical portrait of the founding times. It should have an impact on
contemporary political and legal debates. At a broad level, as William
Casto observes in his chapter on Oliver Ellsworth, it calls into question
some of the basic operating assumptions of originalist historiography, at
least where the Religion Clauses are concerned.
[O]ne conclusion should be clear: justices and scholars who wish
to understand the founders‟ views on religious liberty and churchstate relations should not limit themselves to particular founders
whose views happen to support a particular twenty-first-century
political agenda. . . . James Madison and Oliver Ellsworth—both
critical framers of the First Amendment—had significantly
different views regarding the proper relationship between church
and state. Given this clear disparity, no one should pretend that
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either man‟s carefully thought-out views represent those of the
entire founding generation. (93-94)
Mark Hall makes the same point in his chapter on Roger Sherman.
Noting Sherman‟s belief “that Christianity was necessary for political
prosperity,” (266) Hall concludes that as a matter of historical
scholarship this view has not received its due.
Sherman‟s approach to religious liberty and church-state relations
may seem parochial today. If, however, the founders‟ views are
relevant for contemporary jurisprudence, then there is no good
reason for preferring those of Thomas Jefferson . . . over
Sherman‟s. Moreover, an excellent argument can be made that
Sherman is more representative of the founders with respect to
these issues than Jefferson. (270)
History records that though Jefferson offered moral support (with his
famous letter proposing “a wall of separation of church and state”) to the
Baptists who petitioned the Connecticut state legislature for greater
disestablishment, it was Oliver Ellsworth‟s endorsement of state support
for religious entities that prevailed. Ellsworth was chair of the
committee tasked by the Connecticut General Assembly with
considering the separationist petition.
The committee‟s report,
published under Ellsworth‟s sole signature, concluded that every
member of society should support religious institutions for the secular
good they do. After all, religion is, as Ellsworth wrote, “wisely
calculated to direct men to the performance of all the duties arising from
their connection with each other, and to prevent or repress those evils
which flow from unrestrained passion.” (74)
These brief biographies challenge us to broaden our historical
focus. The real payoff in doing so comes from a greater familiarity with
founders who espoused beliefs about church and state that were
commonly held by members of the founding generation, views that
ought to be a part of the great debate concerning the meaning of the
Religion Clauses. One can always quibble with the choice of figures
selected for inclusion in such a volume,3 but I think this volume would
have been stronger had it been more single-mindedly the historical
ballast that it was not supposed to be. To a large extent, this is the
thematic thrust of The Forgotten Founders on Religion and Public Life,
and to that extent it enriches our understanding of the role that religion
played in the country‟s founding. This role was also played by more
3. For another list of forgotten founders, see MICHAEL NOVAK, ON TWO WINGS: HUMBLE
FAITH AND COMMON SENSE AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 127-58 (Encounter Books 2002).
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overtly religious forgotten voices, like that of the evangelical dissenter
Isaac Backus. Given the strict separationist views of religious
nonconformists (working in the tradition of Roger Williams), the
inclusion of a fitting representative would have gone a long way toward
showing that even within the religious consensus of the eighteenth
century there was complexity enough.
Of course, Jefferson‟s wall would be constructed—and then
deconstructed—by the Supreme Court. In both efforts, the Court turned
to the non-forgotten founders for support. In his study of the process by
which the Court created its high and impregnable wall, Donald
Drakeman argues that “[t]o date, establishment clause jurisprudence
clearly owes a considerable debt to Whiggish myth-making by a number
of respected historians in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”
(11-12) An illuminating history of bad history, Church, State, and
Original Intent is really two books in one: It is 1) a critique of the
Supreme Court‟s early Establishment Clause jurisprudence, a critique
that opens a fascinating historical window on how the Court succumbed
to the temptations of law office history; and 2) an argument that, despite
the opacity of the historical materials we have to work with, it is
possible “to paint a reasonably clear picture of what was going on when
the First Congress had its brief and desultory debate on the
establishment clause.” (196) Accordingly, Drakeman sets out to answer
two questions critical to a proper understanding of the Establishment
Clause:
(1) Why did the Supreme Court pursue this quest for the First
Amendment‟s original meaning, and once it did, where did the
justices find the history they have so firmly grafted onto the text of
the establishment clause? (2) What is a reasonable originalistic
interpretation of the establishment clause in light of all of the
relevant materials? (vii)
In response to the first question, Drakeman has produced a rich and
engaging study of the uses of history made by the Supreme Court in the
seminal cases of Reynolds v. United States (1879) and Everson v. Board
of Education (1947). Drakeman‟s second question (“What is a
reasonable originalistic interpretation of the establishment clause . . .?”)
already answers the work‟s most interesting theoretical quandary: Can
the Supreme Court‟s opinions with regard to the Religion Clauses “flow
naturally and unimpeded from the mandates of the historical record”?
(148) In other words, can history provide a clear path through the
complexity? Well, apparently, good history can.
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Whether or not this is the right answer, it produces a work that
effectively sidesteps a searching look at the premises of the originalist
enterprise. Drakeman spends a worthy chapter on “the explosion of
scholarly literature” (148) that, in his words, has amounted to a battle for
the historical high ground, a battle that has had no clear victor. But he
leaves relatively unaddressed the concern that the battle may be all for
naught. In other words, the net result of Drakeman‟s inquiry is that his
history is the historical high ground. It turns out that the meaning of the
Establishment Clause is not historically indeterminate. In fact, it turns
out that the lack of historical clues to the meaning of the Establishment
Clause is the clue we have been looking for all along.
Drakeman provides a rich and engaging study of Reynolds and
Everson. In these cases, the Supreme Court “located the heart of the
First Amendment‟s religion clauses in what we might now call the
ardently strict separationist branch of the church-state debate.” (63)
Drakeman‟s study of these cases is a fascinating exercise in intellectual
archaeology, tracing the roots that doctrinal, and sometimes personal,
biases took to arrive at a Virginia-centric reading of the Religion
Clauses. It was Chief Justice Morrison Waite‟s decision in Reynolds
that “had the effect of essentially writing Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison directly into the First Amendment.” (21) Drakeman traces the
historical lineage from Justice Waite to George Bancroft, the preeminent
nineteenth-century historian (and, perhaps equally important, neighbor
to the chief justice). Bancroft directed Waite to the Old Dominion, and
the rest is, as they say, history: “Once directed to Virginia by Dr.
Bancroft, the chief justice came under the direct influence of two native
Virginian historians, Robert B. Semple and Robert R. Howison. These
historians shared the view that the Old Dominion was indeed the font of
American freedoms.” (22)
Drakeman is particularly sensitive to how easily history is infected
by ideology of various stripes. Semple and Howison “also happened to
be Baptist and Presbyterian ministers whose ardent opposition to
ecclesiastical establishments was inspired by the dissenting churches‟
persecution at the hands of a legally established church.” (22-23) Thus,
for these makers of history, as well as for the makers of law who relied
on their research, the Jefferson-Madison historical legacy came to stand
for a consensus on the principle of strict separationism, a principle
culled from writings with a specific anti-establishment purpose
(Madison‟s Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments
and Jefferson‟s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom). Waite‟s task
was to craft an opinion that both remained true to what Drakeman calls
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these “odes to religious liberty” (63) and sustained Mr. Reynolds‟s
conviction, against a religious freedom defense, under federal law
outlawing plural marriages in the territories. It is Drakeman‟s
contention that Waite could have relied on other prominent sources “that
not only would have amply supported the conclusion he needed to
reach—that is, that the bigamy conviction be upheld—but, as raw
material for future law office historians, could have taken the
establishment clause in a very different direction.” (64) It is not clear
why Waite did not reach out to other commentators on the Constitution
with which he was familiar, some of whom proffered the notion so
prevalent in the biographies of the forgotten founders: that religion can
and should receive encouragement from the state. What is clear, to
Drakeman, is that Waite‟s choice—the fact that Waite “fell under the
influence of disestablishment historians whose fellow Baptists and
Presbyterians, to gain political advantage in their battles against
Virginia‟s establishment, embraced the bills of the „infidel‟ Jefferson
and rescued Madison‟s Memorial and Remembrance from relative
political obscurity” (72)—set the Supreme Court on a course toward
strict separationist doctrine, a course that would evolve into “irresistible
dogma.” (71) In future Establishment Clause cases, the justices would
choose among different readings of the Jefferson-Madison legacy,
ignoring the competing legacy of a tribe of forgotten founders.
Drakeman ultimately acquits Waite of writing law office history,
resting what culpability there is for constructing history on a biased
platform with the historians Waite consulted, who “took the church-state
question down a somewhat more narrow path than it deserved.” (73) He
is less charitable with regard to the work of Justices Hugo Black and
Wiley Rutledge in the Everson case. Here, Drakeman contends, the
justices quite consciously conflated historical mythmaking and
constitutional doctrine-making. Again, Drakeman provides a rewarding,
if sometimes dispiriting, account of opinion-writing dynamics. Again,
Drakeman finds that history—specifically, the history of Virginia at its
revolutionary and nation-building moments—became the stuff of
“creation myth.” (82) As Drakeman tells the story, “first Rutledge and
then Black set off on a premeditated search-and-employ mission to
locate historical events” that would serve their doctrinal purposes. (7980) As in Reynolds, so in Everson professional historians aided and
abetted the justices‟ efforts via a goal-oriented, Whiggish approach to
historical interpretation. (80) But it was not just that this history was
infected with historiographical bias. Drakeman makes the case—with
appropriate caution—that the Court‟s first reading of the Establishment
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Clause was influenced by the Protestant predispositions of the Court.
The views of the justices and the historians they consulted
reflected . . . mid-twentieth-century liberal intellectuals‟ fears of
any form of authoritarianism, especially Roman Catholicism as
“antagonistic to the „democratic way of life.‟” . . . It is little
wonder that in this cultural context Madison‟s and Jefferson‟s
“strict separationist” writings would provide an appealing
intellectual and constitutional pedigree for a Court anxious to
protect critical democratic institutions, especially the schools, from
the sectarian threat that could be unleashed by a breach in the wall
of separation. (80-81)
Nonetheless, Drakeman looks upon the Everson opinion with some
compassion. Today, he writes, it is easy to see the limitations of hyperWhiggish historical narrative and hagiographic biography. Black and
Rutledge, like Waite before them, could only work with the materials
they had at hand, and what they had were widely read and highly
regarded histories written by scholars whose craftsmanship had not yet
reached the heights of today‟s paragons of nuance. (147-48) (This is a
bit of Whiggish metahistory, I suppose. One wonders how future
generations of historians will view the craft of today‟s practitioners.)
But for years a cottage industry dedicated to the originalist craft has
been setting the Establishment Clause record straight. The fact that this
mighty jousting between strict separationist and nonpreferentialist
camps has more or less resulted in a draw, however, does not deter
Drakeman from entering the fray.
Part of the difficulty the historian of the Religion Clause faces is
the nature of the evidence. Drakeman goes beyond the non-forgotten
founders to consider a wide range of historical materials, yet the
historical background remains frustratingly murky. It is Drakeman‟s
trick to make clarity out of lack of clarity. For Drakeman, the most
striking and significant piece of evidence as to the original meaning of
the Establishment Clause is the lack of historical evidence. Had the
Establishment Clause been meant to embody either a strict separationist
or nonpreferentialist point of view, Drakeman argues, the hue and cry
from the opposing camp would not have been missed. We know what
people were saying about the Establishment Clause at the time it was
adopted and ratified—and, Drakeman claims, they were saying nothing.
It is Holmes who best understands the meaning of this silence. Not
Oliver Wendell, but Sherlock Holmes. The dog, you see, didn‟t bark.
From the striking lack of commentary, let alone protest, on the part of
those who were there at the creation, Drakeman concludes that the
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Establishment Clause meant only that Congress should be prohibited
from establishing a national religion. The First Amendment succeeded
“in turning the hotly contested subject of church-state relations—which
had already caused legislative battles in the states and would continue to
do so virtually in perpetuity—into a „milk and water‟ amendment by
focusing on the one thing no one wanted and everyone could unite
against: a „Church of the United States.‟” (260) The clause was not
meant to embody broad substantive values, (260-61) nor was it meant to
shield state-level establishments from federal meddling. (329)
Drakeman takes no position on whether the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Establishment Clause, but it hardly matters. At the time
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Drakeman contends, the only shared
meaning of the Establishment Clause remained that it “was designed to
forbid a „national religion.‟” (321)
With Vincent Muñoz‟s God and the Founders: Madison,
Washington, and Jefferson, we return full bore to the non-forgotten
founders. But, as this work details, there is diversity enough in Muñoz‟s
founding triumvirate. Muñoz chooses not to enter the originalism fray
directly. Elsewhere, Muñoz has addressed the original meaning of the
Religion Clauses;4 here, he is content to address the question indirectly,
by providing a nuanced reading of the views held by three notable
“fathers” of the Constitution. Of course, as Muñoz notes, this project
does have implications for originalist arguments. Whatever flavor of
originalism one ascribes to, the views of Madison, Washington, and
Jefferson are important. But Muñoz‟s contribution to the originalist
debate is actually quite direct, if only implicitly so. It is Mu ñoz‟s
position that “none of these Founders embraced strict separationism or
nonpreferentialism as those positions are typically understood.” (3)
More to the point, Muñoz argues that Madison, Washington, and
Jefferson—all advocates of religion as a natural right (6-7)—“disagreed
about the separation of church and state and embraced different
understandings of the right to religious liberty.” (3) On such a ground,
Muñoz might have been led to believe that a quest for the original
meaning of the Religion Clauses is “both futile and misdirected.”5
There may be multiple and contradictory original meanings. There may
4. Vincent Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from
the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‟Y 1083 (2008); Vincent Muñoz, The Original
Meaning of the Establishment Clause and the Impossibility of Its Incorporation, 8 UNIV. PA. J.
CONST. L. 585 (2006).
5. See Daan Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality,
45 MD. L. REV. 352, 375 (1986) (“[A] literal quest for the Framers‟ intent may be both futile and
misdirected.”).
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be an original meaning that is little more than an indecipherable
compromise among original meanings.
But historical indeterminancy is not the prevailing theme here.
Whatever ambiguities are to be located within the history of the
Establishment Clause, Muñoz sets out to determine the apparently
unambiguous views of each founder not only on the broadest questions
of religious liberty, but on the narrower point of specific church-state
doctrinal controversies. Muñoz‟s goal is threefold: 1) to describe the
founders‟ “different understandings of the right to religious freedom”; 2)
“to extrapolate legal doctrines from the church-state philosophies of
each Founder”; and 3) “to explain how the Founders‟ different positions
would have adjudicated actual cases that have come before the Supreme
Court.” (8) In short, Muñoz‟s project is to “set the historical record
straight.” (3)
In this regard, he opposes himself to originalists who presume “that
each provision of the Constitution has one definitive original meaning
and that that meaning should govern contemporary constitutional
disputes.” (2) Muñoz assumes, nonetheless, that there is one definitive
original Madisonian or Washingtonian or Jeffersonian view of the
Religion Clauses. But which Madison are we talking about: the
advocate of the Memorial and Remonstrance, the president who issued a
prayer proclamation during the War of 1812, or the more detached
Madison of the Detached Memoranda? Which Washington? Which
Jefferson? Even if we could draw a coherent picture of Madison‟s (or
Washington‟s or Jefferson‟s) view of the Religion Clauses, how do we
leap the chasm from theory to practice? This is a project, if I may
borrow from Stephen Smith, foreordained to failure.6 Perhaps “failure”
is too strong. We simply have no way of evaluating the conclusions
reached by such a speculative and circuitous route. However interesting
the conclusions, they remain, in effect, the result of a mere thought
experiment.
In Muñoz‟s view, Madison emerges as a champion of a “religious
blind” constitution, a constitution that prohibits the state from taking
cognizance of religion, favorably or otherwise. This is neither the
Madison favored by the strict separationists nor the Madison preferred
by the nonpreferentialists. For Muñoz, Madison embraces what is
essentially a church-state non-discrimination principle.

6. See generally STEPHEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
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A Madisonian approach to the First Amendment, accordingly,
would require the state to remain noncognizant of religion. The
government could not use religion as a basis for classifying
citizens. Religion as such could not be the cause of state action, be
the subject of criminal sanctions or governmental regulations, or
be used to determine eligibility for governmental benefits. To
borrow from contemporary civil rights discourse, the Madisonian
position would require the state to remain “religion blind.” (121)
A Madisonian approach to the First Amendment, Muñoz thus concludes,
would not only allow indirect burdens that are the product of neutral and
generally applicable laws, but “would prohibit all religiously based
exemptions from such laws, whether by the judiciary or by ordinary
legislation.” (179)
While Madison wanted to create a governmental blueprint that
would take no notice of religion, Washington sought “to use
governmental authority to encourage religion and to foster the religious
character of the American people.” (50) For Washington, Muñoz writes,
state support of religion was less about freedom of conscience than
about civic stability and prosperity. Washington‟s position was that
“[g]overnment should support religion because religion supports
republican government.” (59)
It would be more accurate to say that Washington‟s position was
that government should support religion when religion supports
government, for Washington was prepared to encourage only those
religious practices that were consistent with “the legitimate duties of
republican citizenship.” (50) If “a pious citizenry was indispensable to
republican government,” (50) a zealous citizenry was all too likely to
advocate behavior that, in Washington‟s view, would be contrary to
good citizenship. (60-61) Whatever Madison may have meant when he
wrote that religious duty is precedent to the claims of civil society,
Washington was not prepared to make civic responsibility secondary to
other duties. For Washington, Muñoz writes, “the obligations of good
citizenship . . . stand as a precondition for one‟s rights to be secured.”
(61) Thus, because the state is under no affirmative obligation to
tolerate actions opposed to good citizenship, the state “may legitimately
expect all citizens to perform the reasonable duties of citizenship, even
those that religious citizens find objectionable.” (60) Under a
Washingtonian approach to the First Amendment, religionists enjoy no
right to exemptions from general law, and legislative accommodations
ought to be limited by prudential concerns. In Muñoz‟s assessment,
“Washingtonianism would not prohibit or grant exemptions from
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indirect burdens on religious practices as long as the state action
burdening religion furthered a legitimate civic interest.” (179)
Muñoz‟s chapter on Jefferson‟s view of religious liberty presents
some especially interesting conclusions. Noting the contradiction
between Jefferson‟s professed philosophy of religious freedom as a
natural right and his actual political practice (particularly, his opposition
to clerical influences on social and educational policy), (72-73) Muñoz
suggests that this tension can be explained as a feature of Jefferson‟s
developmental or progressive view of religious freedom.
Jefferson seems to have believed that different levels of religious
freedom were appropriate for different stages of political and
societal development. He championed the idea that individuals
possessed natural rights of religious freedom and that a just society
should aspire to protect those rights. At the same time, he did not
believe that society could extend all the rights of religious freedom
to religious clergy as long as clergy threatened the rights and
freedoms of others. The “establishment” of religious freedom, as
Jefferson called it, first required freedom from clerical influence in
American society and then, and only then, securing in practice the
natural rights of religious liberty. Jefferson‟s developmental view
of religious freedom meant that the degree to which religious
liberty could be protected depended on the level of rational
development society had achieved. (73)
As evidence of the “progressive nature of [Jefferson‟s] project,”
(73) Muñoz moves from political philosophy to what we might call
Jefferson‟s political pedagogy. According to Muñoz, Jefferson‟s
educational plan “reflect[s] his intention to move the religious views of
the new nation away from ecclesiastical sectarianism toward a more
generic nondenominationalism.” (110) Education was one way to
harness the power of the state in the interest of “nutur[ing] the rational
religious beliefs that [Jefferson] believed supported reason and freedom
and to suppress the irrational dogmas and institutions that he believed to
be hostile to liberty.” (116) That Jefferson‟s vision of civil liberties had
its darker side is not a new observation,7 but Muñoz provides a useful
reminder that one founder‟s enlightenment may well be another‟s
religious Dark Age. It is not surprising that a Jeffersonian approach to
the Religion Clauses, in Muñoz‟s estimation, would favor religion the
least. (189)
7. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE
(Belknap Press 1963); David Tyack, Forming the National Character: Paradox in the
Educational Thought of the Revolutionary Generation, 36 HARV. EDUC. REV. 29 (1966).
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* * *
It is hard to foresee much happiness in the lot of those seeking the
original meaning of the Religion Clauses. We may acknowledge the
opacity of the historical record, the variety of viewpoints held by
founders forgotten and non-forgotten, the humanness of founders who
did not always practice what they preached, even the basic
indeterminancy of language; still, we are seduced by the siren song of
interpretive certainty. But the search for greater clarity is not without its
payoff. As the three books under review here illustrate, the more we
look for answers in the historical record, the more we are likely to find
ambiguity—and with each step we take away from the promised land of
historical clarity, we move a step closer to the richer, if less certain,
terrain of historical truth.

